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"We Germans are indeed obliged without exception to understand clearly the question of our guilt ... What obliges
us is our human dignity ... We cannot be indifferent to what the world thinks of us, for we know we are part of
mankind – are human before we are German." – Karl Jaspers
Abstract
This research, using the writings of German and international intellectuals, journalists, and politicians,
explores the late-twentieth-century German memory of the Holocaust and demonstrates the ways it
was influenced by the international community. The path of this development was rocky and uncertain,
with historical revisionism, denialism, and unchallenged taboo, but also sincere historical engagement.
Reflecting a broader trend in the field of history, this work emphasizes the influence of the transnational
in cultural shifts; rather than depict the German collective memory as static, or solely domestic, it seeks to
demonstrate the influence of international actors, beliefs, and ideas at major inflection points throughout
German history.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Collective memory and shared understandings of history help a people form a national identity. Germans
understand themselves not solely by who and what
they are today, but by where they have come from and
what their shared history means to them. Thus, the past
never really “passes.” The past, instead, lives within the
halls of museums, the pages of textbooks, and most importantly,the hearts and minds of those who collectively
hold a shared history. In examining their past, Germans
struggle to reckon, above all, with the Holocaust. As
German historian Dan Diner has argued, the Holocaust
is an “identity-forming foundational event” for Germany, and the memory of the Holocaust is “basic to
Germany’s moral and historical self-awareness” 1 . The
moment in history when Germans were at their most
destructive and inhumane, is paradoxically the period
most fundamental to contemporary German identity.
The idea that the memory of the Holocaust is significant
for German identity is not new. What is less understood
is the role of the international community in shaping
German reckoning with the past.
The Holocaust was, by design, a transnational genocide. This, and the Allied occupation of Germany after

the end of the war, ensured German memory of the
Holocaust could not develop in isolation. The United
States and Western Europe, from 1945 onward, exerted
major influence in the development of that German
memory. The decades running from 1945 – 2005 featured German and international leaders, intellectuals,
and journalists in conversation about the Holocaust. International observers, especially Americans, expressed
expectations on the formation of a German identity.
This new forming identity, first in West Germany then
in United Germany, entailed democracy and repentance for the Nazi past; these two factors were expected
to function together. To international observers, the
restoration of German democracy had to be connected
to an honest engagement with their Nazi past.
German leaders, intellectuals, and journalists responded to this expectation. As German historian JanWerner Müller posited, West Germany and reunited
Germany both used “history as a base for legitimacy,”
and that narratives about the German past helped to
shape the “perception” of Germans in the present 2 .
Throughout the decades, at several key moments in
West German and German history, international observers and German figures interacted over questions of
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German repentance for the Holocaust and their embrace
of democracy. As British historian Timothy Garton Ash
has argued, West European states, and West Germany
especially, committed to “parliamentary democracy, the
rule of law,” and “market economy” 3 . The institution
of these principles in West Germany was accompanied
by frequent questions about the relationship between
democracy and repentance for the Nazi past. In fact,
international observers referred to these key moments
as a “litmus test” for Germans to prove their repentance, democratic tradition, and historical consciousness. By addressing the international dimension of German memory, this study adds a fresh perspective to a
rich historical literature.
2 HISTORIOGRAPHY
In recent years, scholars have greatly expanded our understanding of German memory. The 1990s experienced
an explosion in memory studies and, as writer Nancy
Wood argued in 1999, “[m]emory is decidedly in fashion” 1 . Wood’s work, Vectors of Memory (1999) effectively
demonstrates the ways “public memory” is shaped by
the “will or desire of some social groups” to “select”
and “organize” portrayals of the past as to influence
others to embrace those portrayals as their own 1 . The
author explores memory in France and Germany and
analyzes how “public debates” in both nations have
become a defining “feature of political culture itself” 1 .
Wood investigates a series of “vectors,” or significant
dynamics influencing public memory, such as historiography, survivor testimonials, trials, novels, films, and
the media. Wood’s interest then lies in reflecting on the
influence these “vectors” had on public debate.
Other scholars have documented significant aspects
of German memory. For instance, German historian
Ulrich Herbert’s “Academic and Public Discourses on
the Holocaust” (1999) explores one major event that
challenged German memory: the Goldhagen debates.
Sparked by Daniel Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing Executioners (1996), the book generated controversy and public debate in Germany. Herbert focuses on this controversy and analyzes responses to the book from German
media and scholars. The author argues that the “course,
form, and results” of the debates were influenced both
by “decades-long” German public and scholarly engagement with the Holocaust and a “trap” set by American journalists 4 . Herbert argues this “trap” was set
by American journalists, who stated that German reaction to Goldhagen’s book would be the “decisive test”
for how Germany has dealt with the Holocaust 4 . German academics and journalists knew their reaction to
Goldhagen was being gauged in a broader context than
simply a reaction to a book.
Alfred Low’s, The Third Reich and the Holocaust in German Historiography (1994), impressively analyzes Ger-

man studies of the Holocaust with an “emphasis” on
the works of “major” German historians 5 . Low then
outlines the works and positions of German scholars, exploring how each engaged with the research of the Holocaust. With this context, Low opines that the “growth”
of German democracy, “greater distance” from Nazi
atrocities, and the growth of neo-conservative and nationalist groups precipitated greater discourse on the
Holocaust into the 1980s and 1990s. Each factor in turn
enabled questions about evolving reunified German
identity to develop with reference to the Nazi past.
Building on this literature, Caroline Sharples’ Postwar
Germany and the Holocaust (2016) evaluates several factors in German memory, including trials, memorials,
film, and prominent narratives, all of which shaped collective German memory. Sharples argues that the development of German memory of the Holocaust is fraught
with “generational conflict,” “competing memories,”
“silences,” and even “mythologies” 6 . All these works
taken together contribute to understanding the development of German memory of the Holocaust. None of
them, however, pay sufficient attention to one of the
major dynamics that influenced German memory of the
Holocaust: expectations from the international community.
This article will evaluate two key episodes in the development of German memory of the Holocaust from
major periods of united German history and indicate
how both were influenced by international actors. It first
explores issues related to German remembrance and
reunification after the fall of the Berlin wall, then dives
into the disruptions surrounding the Goldhagen debates in the 1990s. In Germany, international observers
played a key role in shaping German reckoning with
Nazi atrocities.
3 A NEW GERMANY GRAPPLES WITH
DEMOCRACY AND REPENTANCE
The reunification of Germany, which took place over
several years after the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, was a
pivotal moment in German and European history. The
decision to unify was not an easy one for Germans, who
had for decades grown accustomed to the East/West
division; nor was unification a popular idea on the international stage, as the four former allies – the US, France,
the UK, and the USSR – all had to come to an agreement on how unification was carried out, if done at all.
Nonetheless, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl
proceeded with German reunification negotiations at a
brisk pace. Throughout, Kohl and Germany were tested
as the long shadow of Hitler remained in the minds of
many. Kohl needed to demonstrate his commitment to
democratic traditions and, most importantly, was expected to recognize the Nazi past in order to prevent a
Nazi future.
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The “German question” of whether or not to unify
East and West Germany was one of the foremost problems of the Cold War period. The Cold War nearly
turned hot several times over the fate of Germany, as evidenced by the Berlin Airlift of 1948 – 1949 and the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. As Mark Gilbert has
argued, had there not been the presence of thermonuclear weapons, “there likely would have been a war
over Berlin” 7 . Further, the original purpose of NATO,
according to the organization’s first Secretary General
Lionel Ismay, was to “keep the Soviet Union out, the
Americans in, and the Germans down” 8 . The decision
of West Germany to unite with the East after the fall
of the wall was not received neutrally by the nations
who, for decades, worried over the consequences of a
potential reunification. It was far from a minor domestic
affair between two sister nations. Reunification instead
involved all the major international players, many of
whom still painfully recalled the prior aggression of
Germany. Therefore, the process to merge two states
into one was undertaken both with constant international involvement and acute historical awareness.
French president François Mitterrand worried that
a unified Germany would no longer have any need
for a unified Western Europe and would subsequently
withdraw its support for European integration. British
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, meanwhile, was
firmly opposed to reunification as she feared that a
strengthened Germany would disrupt the power balance within NATO; thereby weakening the United Kingdom 9 . Despite these concerns, Germany was able to
proceed with unification in large part due to the support received from American president George H. W.
Bush. According to American historian William Hitchcock, West German chancellor Helmut Kohl and Bush
“seized upon the historic opportunity offered by the
collapse of the wall to press for a swift unification of
the two Germanys” 9 .
In order to reunite and regain full sovereignty, Germany needed the assent of the four former allies. To assuage international fears and incentivize support, Kohl
needed to face each concern directly. Kohl assured Mitterrand that in unifying, Germany would not seek to
separate itself from the process of European integration 9 . Mikhail Gorbachev of the USSR, who at first demanded Germany’s withdrawal from NATO, settled
on accepting an “economic credit of 5 billion deutsche
marks” and general realignment of NATO in Europe to
“reflect the new relationships with the USSR” 9 . Some
of the most substantial concerns were associated with
memory of the Second World War and are best exemplified by the fears of Thatcher. She was concerned that
“certain ‘German characteristics’ might soon reappear:
‘angst, aggressiveness, assertiveness, bullying, egotism,
inferiority complex, and sentimentality ...’” 9 To address
these particular concerns, which were present in the

minds of many, Kohl found that once again, he needed
to demonstrate German political and cultural character
which was honed over the decades following 1945.
Throughout the negotiations, Kohl maintained a stalwart belief that unification should only occur so long as
West Germany’s democratic institutions and free market were protected. Bush assured Kohl he had American
support, as he “trusted the West Germans to handle the
issue of unification while not endangering the Western
alliance or harming the institutions of the European
community” 9 . This indicates one of the fundamental
characteristics of German reunification: namely that it
could only occur if the new state maintained the democratic traditions it inherited, as shaped by the Western
Allies, decades before.
These democratic traditions extended into the academic world and even to genuine recognition of their
Nazi past. A draft treaty of unification, released to the
public in August of 1990, referenced modern Germany’s
responsibility to the Holocaust, saying “a unified German state would be conscious of the continuity of German history and the resulting special responsibility for
human rights and peace” 10 . American theologian Donald Shriver Jr. argued in the Los Angeles Times that as the
Germans united, they also “embrace democracy and
repentance [for the Nazi past]” 11 . To American journalist David Kantor of the Jewish Advocate, the somewhat vague statement in the draft treaty did not go far
enough in acknowledging the genocide of the Jews. He
argued the draft treaty not only failed to refer to the
Nazi past, but such an omission was a cause for “sorrow and concern” 10 . There are two key ideas from these
articles. First, upon unification, Germans were expected
to embrace democracy and repentance for the Nazi past.
Second, the international community watched and reinforced the demand for German recognition of the
Holocaust throughout unification.
German repentance and democratic traditions were
put to the test shortly after reunification. In 1995, worldwide celebrations marking the fiftieth anniversary of
Victory in Europe Day provided the opportunity for
Germans to publicly acknowledge their past. The flag
of unified Germany flew in Paris alongside the flags of
Russia, France, the UK, and the US, symbolically joining
“the colors of the Allied powers” in a military parade 12 .
On the same day in Berlin, a group of world leaders
including American Vice President Al Gore, Mitterrand,
German president Roman Herzog, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, and British Prime Minister
John Major gathered at the Schauspielhaus theater to
celebrate and preach unity. Mitterrand declared “[t]he
enemy of yesterday is the friend of today,” and the victory of V-E day “was a victory of Europe over itself” 12 .
Throughout the event, German recognition and repentance was clear. Herzog claimed “Germans today know
very well – probably more clearly than 50 years ago
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– that it was their government and many of their fathers who were responsible for the Holocaust and who
brought ruin upon the nations of Europe” 12 . Respectfully, the other world leaders recognized the accomplishments of the new republic. Gore recalled Dwight
Eisenhower’s old declaration, “the successes of the war
effort wouldn’t be known until the 50th anniversary of
V-E Day. If Germany is a stable democracy, then we will
have succeeded” 12 . Gore confidently proclaimed, “I
wish to report to Gen. Eisenhower: Mission fulfilled” 12 .
Leaders from formerly antagonistic nations stood together and recognized the growth Germany achieved,
all while Germany demonstrated both its democracy
and repentance for the past.
Despite such proclamations, reunification posed a serious challenge for Germany memory of the Holocaust.
West Germans politically overseeing the process had
to grapple with integrating the disparate experiences
and memories of East Germans, who had lived under
Stasi domination for decades. Reunification forced Germans to “integrate these disparate postwar experiences
into a national historical memory and devise ways to
recall the victims of the so-called ‘double past’ – that of
the Third Reich and the GDR” 6 . As the Berlin Wall fell,
many in the intellectual left were opposed to unification. They feared that with the integration of 17 million
formerly undemocratic East Germans, Germany might
again “suffer from a democratic deficit and see renewed
nationalism” 2 . Jürgen Habermas expressed alarm over
the process, as he feared pursuing reunification signaled a return to conceptualizing the German people
along nationalistic, rather than democratic lines. He felt
Germans needed to not only “display but progressively
internalize their commitment to constitutional patriotism,” and “Germany was once again short-circuiting
the lessons of historical memory” [emphasis added] 1 .
There were concerns among international academics
as well. As Senior Associate for the US-based Endowment for International Peace Daniel Hamilton outlined,
East Germans might have a “considerable impact” on
their West German relatives 13 . His concern came from
the fact that Communist-led East Germans had been
unable to experience the “difficult process of digesting
the Nazi past” due to Communist propaganda 13 . Unification, to observers domestically and internationally,
may have posed a serious problem by enflaming rightwing nationalism. Despite these valid concerns, as historian Jan-Werner Müller argued, “there was no overall
shift to the right” in the post-reunification years 2 . Their
concerns proved legitimate but not until long after reunification. Müller attributed this continuity of liberal
democracy to Helmut Kohl due to his genuine commitment to European unity and to the vigilance of German
public intellectuals. West German intellectuals played a
key role in maintaining liberal democracy; however, a
thriving “liberal and democratic” political culture most

helped to maintain the vitality of German democracy
post-unification 2 .
The completion of the final treaties of reunification
signaled the genesis of a new nation. After almost five
decades, East and West became one. Though young,
the nation was founded on principles present in West
Germany for decades. West German intellectuals, vigilant of West Germany’s place in the international order, contributed a great deal to the foundation upon
which reunified Germany built itself. Remembering
the Holocaust, embracing the past, and committing to
principles of democratic traditions were all hotly contested throughout the previous decades. Reunification
did not end these debates and in some ways amplified
them. Vergangenheitsbewältigung (coming to terms with
the past) was a central part of contemporary German
identity. It was inherited from the decades of West German engagement with the Holocaust but also inherited
from the Western principles West Germans slowly embraced. The Germany that emerged in 1991 featured
the legacy of West German intellectual engagement and
integration into the Western world.
4 A CHALLENGE TO ACADEMIC STUDY OF
THE HOLOCAUST: THE GOLDHAGEN
DEBATES
The events that took place in 1996, only a few years after
Germany’s reunification, set a new intellectual course
for German memory of the Holocaust. In March, a littleknown American political scientist named Daniel Goldhagen published Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary
Germans and the Holocaust. Goldhagen, a professor at
Harvard and son of a Jewish Holocaust survivor, recalibrated German academic discussion of the Holocaust.
Where previously the Historikerstreit had brought academic attention to the Holocaust in West Germany and
reasserted that the Holocaust should indeed be studied,
Goldhagen questioned how the Holocaust should be
studied. Goldhagen served for a short time as a conduit for international public opinion about the Holocaust and was effectively able to insert himself into German academic discussion on the issue. Within several
months of the publication of Hitler’s Willing Executioners,
Goldhagen conducted a speaking tour throughout Germany, involved himself in several serious debates about
the nature of the Holocaust, and had “monopolized
public discussion” 4 . His study became so well known
that, according to historian Ulrich Herbert, “the Holocaust and Goldhagen became virtually synonymous” 4 .
Despite his popularity in the media and among the
public, academic historians in Germany and around the
world criticized Goldhagen’s work 4 .
Goldhagen argued that most ordinary Germans were
willing, even enthusiastic contributors to the Holocaust
as a consequence of a centuries-old, destructive form of
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anti-Semitism innate to German culture. In its sweeping narrative and grand conclusion, many historians
found far too much generalization, and far too little evidence. The differences between the academic fields of
political science and history were relevant here. American political scientist Jack Levy identified these differences. Levy argued historians “describe, explain, and
interpret” events. Conversely, political scientists “generalize” about connections between different variables
and seek to “construct lawlike statements about social behavior.” 14 As a political scientist, Goldhagen
focused on one aspect of continuity in German society; the “antisemitism moved many thousands of ‘ordinary’ Germans – and would have moved millions
more. . . to slaughter Jews” 15 . Goldhagen alleged the
pervasiveness of one cultural attribute, antisemitism,
determined the actionsof every perpetrator of the Holocaust. Further, Goldhagen’s generalizations extended
to each facet of his evaluation. He argued “every significant institution in Germany supported a malevolent image of Jews, and virtually every one of them
actively contributed to the eliminationist program” 15 .
Similarly, “Germany during the Nazi period was inhabited by people animated by beliefs about Jews that
made them willing to become consenting mass executioners” 15 . Goldhagen emphasized centuries-long continuity over circumstances and contingencies, which
are factors prioritized by historians.
Speaking on his motivation for writing the book,
Goldhagen referenced a lecture about the Holocaust,
where he remembered: “everyone was talking about
why the order was given, but not about why it was
carried out” 16 . He sought to outline what exactly about
German culture and society could lead to the genocide
of six million Jews. Goldhagen stated that postwar Germany was a “very changed country. . . [i]t’s very hard
for an individual to maintain views the whole world is
saying are wrong” 16 . Goldhagen was not attempting to
address latent anti-Semitism in contemporary Germany,
as he believed that Germany changed dramatically after
the war. Instead, he sought a reformation for how Germans discussed, researched, and understood the perpetrators of the Holocaust. He argued his account raised
“difficult issues that Germans need to address” 16 . His
main thesis, “antisemitism moved many thousands of
‘ordinary’ Germans – and would have moved millions
more. . . to slaughter Jews” 15 , attempted to demonstrate
the apparent bloodlust of almost the entirety of German
society.
Goldhagen removed the Holocaust from its context,
even in how he examined the psychology of the perpetrators. As American historian Omer Bartov argued,
Goldhagen’s empathy was shown exclusively to the
victims rather than the perpetrators and he instead focused on “portraying them as sadistic murderers” 17 .
Goldhagen was not interested in exploring the multi-

faceted motivation, or the contingencies surrounding
the perpetration of the Holocaust, but rather explaining the Holocaust by focusing primarily on one major factor: centuries-old anti-Semitism rooted in most
of the German public. The issue came from the simplicity of the argument. Most German historians believed anti-Semitism was one of the many factors that
spurred on the Holocaust. Could a genocide really
be entirely explained primarily by centuries-old antiSemitism among the German public? As Herbert argued, Goldhagen divorced the Holocaust “from the
German war effort and brutal extermination policy,”
which included Jews, but also many other minorities 4 .
Anti-Semitism did not help to explain the massacre
of Russian prisoners of war, Poles, the Roma/Sinti, or
those deemed as mentally or physically disabled. Goldhagen’s book was largely rejected in academia, where it
was described as “evidentially inadequate and methodologically simplistic” 4 .
One of Goldhagen’s prime adversaries, historian
Hans Mommsen, debated him largely on historical
grounds. Mommsen was involved in the Historikerstreit
and the debates between Functionalists and Intentionalists from the 1960s, and he was familiar with public debate over German memory and identity. He had
long argued that Hitler was a “weak dictator,” which
meant that much of the “Final Solution” was carried out
by the compliance, apathy, and endorsement of broad
segments of society 18 . German responsibility included
many Nazis and Holocaust perpetrators but did not
encompass the entire German society, as Goldhagen
argued 19 . Mommsen felt Goldhagen rejected the cautiously constructed argument made by many German
historians which emphasized “more complex understandings of what made the Third Reich tick” 19 .
In September of 1996, Goldhagen actively debated
several German historians, including Mommsen, on a
stage in Berlin. Several of the historians accused Goldhagen of “simplifications and abbreviations” 20 . Mommsen argued “[t]he specific killing of the Jews was that
it was not spontaneous, emotional killing. . . to reduce
it to a bloodlust among ordinary Germans is inadmissible" 20 . Goldhagen saw his work as accomplishing
more than pressing the specific conclusion he endorsed.
Alan Cowell, journalist for the New York Times, indicated that Goldhagen was “credited with. . . transferring the Holocaust debate from the groves of academe
to a broader public.” While Cowell neglects the influence of the Historikerstreit, the point confirms what Goldhagen believed he was accomplishing. The value of
Hitler’s Willing Executioners was not derived from its
academic merit, but instead came from bringing the
debate about the Holocaust into the limelight of public
thought in Germany and internationally.
The relationship between German identity and history, even after reunification, was not relegated to the
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boundaries of the Federal Republic alone. Throughout
the Goldhagen debates, public opinion was heavily influenced by the perspectives of the international community, particularly in the United States. The New York
Times published five pieces on the topic in the span of a
few days, and throughout them is a clear tone, insisting
that “the German reaction to the book would be the decisive test for its dealing with the Holocaust” 4 . American
journalist Richard Bernstein argued that Hitler’s Willing Executioners “is one of those rare new works that
merit the appellation landmark” 21 . Michael Ackerman
argued that “[t]he issues raised by [Goldhagen] must be
explored by students of history, regardless of how uncomfortable this proves for Germans” 22 . The German
press picked up on this and echoed many similar concerns, with German historian Volker Ullrich in Die Zeit
saying “[h]ow his provocative and disturbing piece is
received – by that measure, much will be gauged about
the historical consciousness of this republic” 4 .
The reception of Goldhagen in Germany was thus not
only explicitly linked to the decades of historical debate
over identity but was further influenced by the expectations of the international community.[58] These international expectations established what Herbert called an
“intellectual trap” from which Germans could not easily escape. To the international community, especially
American news media, Germans failing to praise Goldhagen sufficiently might be connected to not only denying the conclusions of Goldhagen’s book, but denying
the impact of the Holocaust itself. Germans themselves
expressed awareness of this “trap,” and some went so
far as to argue that the theory of collective guilt was
reimplemented into Germany with Goldhagen as the
vessel and the international public as the force behind
it. This trap could be read in Der Spiegel, noting that
“Goldhagen has revived” the Allies’ use of collective
guilt theories to persecute post-war Germans.
Some German figures, however, recognized the value
of bringing an international public into the debate about
the Holocaust. In March 1997, the German magazine
Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik (Pieces on
German and International politics) awarded Goldhagen its Democracy Prize 19 . Jürgen Habermas waded
once again into public debates. Unlike many other senior scholars, however, he did so in defense of Goldhagen. Speaking at the award ceremony where Goldhagen
was given the Democracy Prize, Habermas argued that
through the “urgency, the forcefulness, and the moral
strength of his presentation, Goldhagen had provided
a powerful stimulus to the public conscience of the
Federal Republic” 23 . Habermas managed to both recognize and praise the social accomplishments of the study
without praising the book’s academic merits. In doing
so, Habermas left room for figures like Mommsen to
uphold their scholarly disagreements with it.
The success of Goldhagen in effecting change in Ger-

many, while largely attributable to the reception of the
public at large, was most prominently furthered by his
popularity among German university students. As Herbert indicated, “Hitler’s Willing Executioners fulfills an
understandable desire on the part of younger Germans:
by agreeing with his book, they can stand on the side
of the accusers rather than that of the accused” 4 . Thus,
part of the positive reception Goldhagen experienced
came from the younger generation wanting to be perceived as aware of their nation’s past but ready to face
the future as a changed society. They wanted to “show
the world” that they had learned from the decades of
debate, and from Goldhagen, and that they were, in
fact, a new people.
On a deeper level, however, reception among
younger generations, especially among college students,
demonstrated the perceived inadequacies of German
academia in handling the Holocaust. While the Historikerstreit managed to bring the Holocaust to the fore of
German discussion, and reshape the way many Germans conceptualized their past, it did not change the
way German academia researched or taught issues related to the Holocaust. Effecting this change was one
of the major triumphs of the Goldhagen debates. Previously the Holocaust was lectured on in a “theoretical
and detached” manner,concerned with issues such as
“totalitarianism, bureaucratic rule, and a fragmented
decision making process,” as seen in the functionalism/intentionalism debates of the 1950s – 70s 17 . German college students then longed for an open, provocative discussion of the Holocaust, which they largely
found in Goldhagen. Despite his scholarly missteps,
Goldhagen reintroduced more personal and honest topics to the discussion of the Holocaust, such as the largely
ignored “question of guilt and responsibility” as well
as the horrors of genocide; this differed greatly from
the distanced, bloodness interpretations that were so
commonplace among German academics 17 .
To Ulrich Herbert, the reason for the public/academic
division, came down to the different spheres in which
the work appeared. Historians regarded the book as a
scholarly work and evaluated it as a study, whereas the
public interpreted the piece as a crucial moment in the
decades-long debate about German memory. The effusive public praise Goldhagen received, then, must be
connected to this context. The German public demonstrated the importance of engaging with the Nazi past
in their acceptance of Goldhagen. Goldhagen’s damning generalizations and models, despite their rejection
in German academia, were incredibly effective. Conclusions like his, that all ordinary Germans were responsible or willing contributors to the Holocaust, demanded
change from the German academia, which was regularly stuck to a specific model of engaging with the
Holocaust through a theoretical, distanced lens. Goldhagen brought the perpetrators to the forefront of research
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on the Holocaust. As Herbert argued, he demonstrated
“the necessity of returning to the face-to-face killing”
and helped to move research on the Holocaust away
from its detached approach 17 .
According to Eley, the “Goldhagen effect” did not
merely come down to the scholarly conclusions of the
book. Instead, the success of Goldhagen was in his contributions to “a long-running public struggle to ground
the ethics of democratic citizenship” in Germany, where
the Nazi past seemed to prevent the use of the national
past as a “source of inspiration” 19 . Hitler’s Willing Executioners then ought not to be taken merely at face
value, as its importance lay in its effecting change in
German society. As Bartov argued, the implication and
impact of the Goldhagen debate on academia in Germany were tremendous. The debate forced German academics to recognize “the centrality of” the Holocaust
and to “change the methodology of research on” it 17 .
The reception of Goldhagen among the German public
managed to demonstrate that “Nazism ... remained a
crucial issue in German political, intellectual, and scholarly discourse” 17 .
Further, Bartov identified a compelling distinction between the scholarly reception of Goldhagen by German
and American academics. While German historians had
largely criticized Goldhagen throughout his speaking
tour, they slowly began to recognize the social value
of reconsidering how the Holocaust was researched;
American historians largely did not. In America, Goldhagen’s “long-term impact on the scholarship of the period” was not “particularly significant” 17 . Similarly, the
reception of Goldhagen was largely positive in American media, but in Germany it was critiqued by academics. Jewish American author Burton Hersh argued
in a letter to the editor of the New York Times that Goldhagen used an “ant’s-eye view,” which reflected “a very
limited sense of the character of the complex, multilayered culture” of Germany since 1914 24 . Furthermore,
the book generated “only limited intellectual interest”
in France and Israel, demonstrating some degree of
solidarity among historians across national divides 17 .
Thus, Goldhagen’s significance was only clear among
Germans, and even there it was initially deeply challenged.
The key legacy of Goldhagen and the Goldhagen
debates will not be the use of Hitler’s Willing Executioners in German classrooms. According to Herbert, by
1999, three years after the book’s publication, Hitler’s
Willing Executioners did not “appear in the syllabi of
university courses on the Holocaust” in Germany 4 . Instead, Goldhagen’s influence has resulted in a recalibration of the collective German perspective on the
Holocaust. Where the Historikerstreit enforced the idea
that the Holocaust should be discussed, the Goldhagen
debates forced German historians to reconsider how
the Holocaust is researched. In the following decade,

public debate shifted again through another vector: the
construction of a memorial.
5 CONCLUSION
These case studies demonstrate that the international
community played a key role in shaping the memory
of the Holocaust. The international community was
yet another factor that influenced the development of
German memory. German scholars, leaders, and journalists conversed with international figures, changing
the way Germans memorialized, researched, and discussed the Holocaust; these discussions, in turn, impacted questions about what it means to be German,
post-Auschwitz.
Today, Germans continue to engage with memory
of the Holocaust. In recent years, the rise of the German far-right political party Alternative for Germany
(Alternative für Deutschland/AfD) has again forced Germans to grapple with memory of the Holocaust. As
contemporary commentators on German reunification
feared, many AfD voters and party leaders come from
East Germany. Lower relative prosperity provoked a
sense of being “second-class citizens” in many East Germans 25 . On a more subconscious level, however, eastern German support for the AfD is likely also rooted in
the difference in Holocaust education during the Cold
War. For decades, West Germans reinvestigated what
it meant to have a national identity in the shadow of
Nazism. East Germans, however, did not experience
such development.
There is, in fact, still a sense among many Germans
and international observers that Germany is not doing enough to address recent shifts to the right. Peter
Eisenman, architect of the Holocaust memorial in Berlin,
argued in 2016 that because of the “growing hatred
and anti-Semitism across Europe” his memorial project
“wouldn’t be built today” 26 . German-Jewish writer Max
Czollek, in his 2020 book De-integrate Yourselves, argues
that Jewish Germans symbolize the “German narrative
of not being Nazi anymore” 27 . He goes on to say, that
despite having many Jewish Germans, Germany is failing to reckon with the recent “rise of anti-Semitism,
xenophobia, and racism,” symbolized by the popularity
of the AfD 27 .
Nonetheless, German politicians frequently reference
the German past to international audiences. On May 8,
2020, the 75th anniversary of V-E day, many public figures connected Germany’s Nazi past with responsibility
to the present. German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas
proclaimed in a memo to all German diplomatic missions that Germany’s commitment to “human rights,”
and “international cooperation,” stem from the knowledge of “the unparalleled crimes. . . that found their
most monstrous expression in the Holocaust” 28 . He
went on to say that German history reveals the threat
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of “revisionism that replaces rational thinking with national myths”, addressing revisionism and the recent
rise of nationalism in Germany 28 . Maas argued there
is no question that “Germany alone unleashed the Second World War,” and that people who seek to revise
this sentiment “do injustice to the victims, exploit history for their own ends and divide Europe” 28 . Similarly, in celebration of V-E day, the German Delegation to NATO proclaimed in a tweet that “Germany
accepts full responsibility for the atrocities committed
by Nazi Germany.” Indeed, as Nancy Wood suggests, it
may be better to conceptualize grappling with the past,
not as Vergangenheitsbewältigung, which implies that the
past can be definitively overcome, but instead as Aufarbeitung (to grapple with something), which instead
indicates a never-ending engagement with the past 1 .
I have argued that the international community, explicitly, through occupation policies in the early postwar years and, subtly, later through diplomacy and proclaimed expectations, shaped German memory of the
Holocaust. Throughout the decades, as Germans found
new ways to engage with memory of the Holocaust,
they once again forged a new national identity in the
wake of Nazism. Just as the Western Allies originally
hoped, the business of recreating a nation was not done
in the old political and ideological framework of radical
nationalism. Instead, it was done within the framework
of the expected “Western” ideals, with a commitment
to pluralism, democracy, and academic freedom. Thus,
German memory of the Holocaust ought to be understood not as the product of isolated scholar opinion,
but as the culmination of factors, internal and external,
that shaped the identity of a nation. This memory-work
lived and breathed in public debates over the decades,
and shaped a national identity fundamentally committed to questioning the legacy of the past.
6 FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The opportunities for historical research in German
memory are vast, despite the expansive literature that
already exists on German history and the Holocaust.
Historians are, in recent years, attributing greater and
greater influence on issues that span borders and cross
cultures under the umbrella term of Globalization. Perhaps this article demonstrates an early, and unconscious, reflection of the significance of non-national narratives in the field of history 29 . Such work analyzing
the non-German sources of German engagement with
memory of the Holocaust has great potential, whether
emphasizing new populations or new theoretical models of approach. In the field of history, post-structural
theorists emphasize the sources of power in language.
A post-structuralist approach could be applied to the
language used both by Germans and international commentators, analyzing the origins of power in Holocaust

memory discourse. Similarly relevant is the intricate
relationship between Israel and West Germany. How
might Israelis have contributed to memory construction? Likewise, how might memory construction in East
Germany be influenced by Soviet regulations and more
indirect expectations? The relationship between international figures and domestic memory construction offers
many potential directions of study.
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